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AN ESSAY ON EDEN
Hud Hudson
Despite an impressive tradition, modern literalists about the Garden of Eden 
have come under severe criticism and ridicule on the grounds that contem-
porary science has thoroughly discredited such a view. Accordingly, the pre-
vailing trend in modern theology is to dehistoricize the Fall. I am no fan of 
literalism, but in this paper I argue that these grounds are in need of supple-
mentation by a piece of metaphysics that has not been adequately defended. 
Absent the additional metaphysical thesis, it is possible to grant all the al-
leged implications of our modern worldview informed by physics, astrono-
my, chemistry, geology, and biology and nevertheless remain a proponent of 
literalism—without becoming a proper object of ridicule. Or, if still ridiculous, 
this status will have to be established by discrediting a piece of metaphysics 
and not by admiring the fruits of empirical science.
Sometimes you find yourself in a debate featuring several competing 
views, you have a horse in the race, and you’re doing your best to back 
your favorite. But it seems to you that one of the other views that you don’t 
endorse has been treated unjustly. Perhaps you think it hasn’t been for-
mulated properly, or perhaps you think it has been formulated properly 
but owing to the undistinguished credentials of its proponents it hasn’t 
received a fair hearing, or perhaps you think it has been both successfully 
formulated and heard but that it has been too-hastily dismissed on inad-
equate grounds. Nothing new there.
Occasionally, though, this dismissal becomes so popular and so con-
temptuous that it invites ridicule both of the position and of its former 
adherents, and should anyone be foolish enough to continue to express 
any sympathy for the view, it invites and sustains charges of irremediable 
stupidity or perhaps even of wickedness. Understandably, even though 
you don’t endorse the view and, in fact, would like to see it refuted, you 
may develop an interest in trying to help rescue it from the fate of be-
ing cast aside for insufficient reasons and in trying to interfere with the 
constant bad-mouthing of its would-be champions. The present paper re-
volves around an example of this kind.
First, let me say something about the kind of argument that generates 
such a contemptuous dismissal.1 Every once in awhile one encounters a 
1A portion of this paragraph of the text is taken from chapter 8 of The Metaphysics of Hy-
perspace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), in which I investigated and critically evalu-
ated several other instances of this general argument type.
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particularly aggressive brand of atheism that mistakes some amorphous 
thing called ‘our modern worldview’ for an invulnerable fortress, sets up 
residence there, and then launches volleys from the apparent safety of its 
walls against various Christian doctrines and themes. Some of these of-
fensives are sophisticated and challenging, some are not, and some appear 
to be more sophisticated and challenging than they are. Here is the central 
form of the kind of argument in question.
1) Christians believe that P.
2) Our modern worldview implies that P is false.
3) If (1) and (2), then we are justified in believing that the Christian 
belief that P is false.
4) Hence, we are justified in believing that the Christian belief that P 
is false.
As stated, this argument form might well be thought to have a few vul-
nerabilities. There are, of course, numerous and long-lasting disputes on 
the minimal belief-conditions for being Christian, and thus substitutions 
on premise (1) are likely to prove controversial. Moreover, divergent opin-
ions on the elusive referent and epistemic status of the phrase ‘our modern 
worldview’ (featured in premise (3)) are certain to generate disagreement 
concerning its power to undermine justification in those beliefs it contra-
dicts. On the present occasion, however, I will be content to let premises 
(1) and (3) alone, and instead I will direct my critical remarks at what will 
play the role of premise (2) in the argument to be examined below.
If you were asked to identify a view that has the double-feature of being 
intimately connected with Christianity in the popular mind and of being 
the subject of almost universal rejection and withering criticism generated 
by an argument of the form just described, you would be hard pressed 
to find a better response than the following story (which I here present 
without the pretense of precisely representing any special tradition’s or 
historical figure’s take on the events, but rather in a popular-conception, 
mixed-bag, hodge-podge sort of way—making the view all that much 
more of a target).
Once upon a time, there was a privileged and sacred place that played a 
unique role in the divine plan . . . a garden planted eastward in Eden. In 
the midst of this garden God placed a man formed from the dust of the 
ground. God instructed him to care for the garden, provided him with 
a helpmate and companion, and forbade him to eat of one fruit—that of 
the tree of knowledge.
But although these our ancestors were made just and right—suffi-
cient to have stood, though free to Fall—they rebelled against God and 
in so doing damaged themselves and their progeny in a way neither 
they nor any of their descendants could rectify on their own power, 
for this disobedience was punished by banishment from the garden 
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and the loss of a certain innocence, immunity, safety, and grace. Thus 
through sin did disease, suffering, and death come into our world.
Nowadays we’re informed that no one save the incurable rubes I men-
tioned earlier can give this story any credence at all. To the extent that this 
or that untenable aspect of it is really bound up with Christianity proper . . . 
well, so much the worse for Christianity proper.
And it would seem that those in a position to reply on behalf of Chris-
tianity proper have largely adopted a strategy of retreat.2 I’m certainly no 
authority or spokesman for that tradition, but my own view follows this 
path of retreat as well. . . . I take the Adam and Eve story (in almost all of 
its details) to be mythical. Although insofar as I believe the construction 
and preservation of that myth was conducted under the influence of the 
Holy Spirit, I take it to have special significance and to touch on topics of 
consequence to all human persons (near and far, past and future). While 
admiring memorable devices such as talking snakes and luscious yet for-
bidden fruits, I take the primary function of the myth to document the 
occurrence of a historical event involving our ancestors—namely, their 
falling away from God and their separating themselves and their descen-
dants from the divine presence. Whether this Fall was embodied in some 
special individual or pair of individuals; whether it was accompanied by 
a loss of preternatural gifts; whether it marked a sudden change in the 
biology or genetics of its participants, or in the environment in which they 
lived and died, or in the laws that governed that environment—are all 
questions on which I am willing to take no stand whatsoever.
To be fair, such retreat isn’t an exclusively modern phenomenon, and it 
is my understanding that the current inclination to regard tales of the Gar-
den of Eden as charming and quaint allegory has early roots in prominent 
figures in the history of Christianity. Philo (in the first century), Origen (in 
the third century), and St. Ephraem and St. Gregory of Nyssa (both in the 
fourth century) all advocated a nonliteral interpretation of the story of the 
garden, its tree of life, its stunning variety of flora and fauna, and its re-
markably well-behaved wildlife. But then again, equally prominent early 
literalists can be found, with St. Theophilus of Antioch (in the second centu-
ry), St. Irenaeus and St. Hippolytus (both in the third century), and Bishop 
Epiphanius (in the fourth century) all arguing for the claims that Paradise 
was beneath the Heavens, its garden, trees, and rivers all material created 
things, and its genuine location eastward in Eden a historical reality.
Moreover (and significantly), it is my understanding that throughout 
much of Christian history, its leading figures have tended toward realist 
over figurative readings of the garden passages in Genesis. Undoubtedly, 
much of this consensus can be traced to the qualified endorsement of Au-
2This and the next four paragraphs of the text are again taken from chapter 8 of The Meta-
physics of Hyperspace, in which I explored various aspects of Christianity (including the Gar-
den myth) against the backdrop of a fourth spatial-dimension. For the historical references, I 
am indebted to Jean Delumeau’s delightful History of Paradise: The Garden of Eden in Myth and 
Tradition, trans. Matthew O’Connell (New York: Continuum, 1995).
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gustine and the heavy endorsement of Aquinas, with the Bishop of Hippo 
and the Angelic Doctor both fully acknowledging the spiritual meaning of 
the story while firmly insisting on the materiality of the tree of life and on 
the corporeality of the rivers watering a spatially located garden. Notwith-
standing such champions, traditional reasons for finding realism attrac-
tive have always been controversial. Nevertheless they have been com-
pelling to many. The justifications range from applying widely accepted 
principles about what factual lessons may be appropriately drawn from 
the different forms of narrative found in Scripture, to generating argu-
ments to the [then] best explanation of the origin of species, to providing a 
temporary home for Enoch and Elijah—notable for being taken out of this 
world prior to their deaths (joined perhaps by the saints and martyrs), to 
furnishing a way for Christ to keep his promise to the good thief without 
thereby requiring a doctrine of immediate judgment and resurrection, to 
making a truth teller out of Paul and his tale of a third heaven in 2 Corin-
thians, to reconciling various claims in Revelation with what was already 
well known about the world’s inhabitants and laws, to serving as a place of 
rest without decay for the bodies of the departed (or at least certain of their 
parts) to lie in wait for the day of judgment and hopeful resurrection.3
While running unopposed, as it were, generations of devoted and 
extravagant proponents of a historical Eden authored flowery passages 
on the characteristics of the garden and fought bitter arguments about 
the spatiotemporal location of Paradise, passages and arguments that 
frequently contain considerably more detail than the available evidence 
might have warranted. Despite these intricate and fascinating battles over 
geography and chronology, a commonly shared presumption among the 
combatants was that wherever Eden was located, the sin of our predeces-
sors had rendered it inaccessible to us—its paths now barred by a flaming 
sword and cherubim charged with making its entrance impassable to all 
flesh. Of course, agreement on the impassibility doctrine would lead to a 
conviction that a certain kind of resolution to the dispute on location was 
simply unattainable; with cherubim on patrol, it’s not as if the winning 
theory simply awaited verification by expedition.
Inevitably, however, the wild exuberance of the Middle Ages and the 
remarkable ingenuity of its realist representatives gave way to a sober-
ing this-worldly orientation of the 18th Century and to apologetic and 
more scientifically-informed Christians who (feeling the pressure of that 
oracle—our modern worldview) were willing and even eager to retreat 
to a symbolic reading of the Genesaic garden. Unsurprisingly, a primary 
catalyst for this turn of mind in the history of Christian thought was buried 
in the fossil beds and in what they appeared to say about the age of the 
Earth, the absence of a great deluge, and the origin of species. Or, to focus 
on a historically perplexing example, consider a mighty stumbling block 
for the Renaissance pastime of rediscovering the location of the garden 
3Again, for the fascinating details, see Delumeau, History of Paradise.
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on Earth: given the assumptions then in play, the garden must have been 
magnificently large in order to house the stunning variety of beasts and 
plants and water enough to supply four major rivers. For a variety of rea-
sons, nonliteralism has prevailed.
How might we briefly state the case, then, from our modern worldview 
to the denial of our story? Perhaps as does Ian McFarland when explain-
ing the trend in modern theology to dehistoricize the Fall:
An obvious objection to the idea of original sin is that it depends on a falla-
cious account of human history. In both its eastern and western forms, origi-
nal sin refers to a historical act committed by the first human pair, the effects 
of which are passed on to all subsequent generations. The plausibility of this 
claim is undermined by contemporary scientific accounts of human origins, 
which deviate from that recorded in Genesis. It is now beyond dispute that 
there was no point when human existence was characterized by immunity 
from death, absence of labour pains, or an ability to acquire food without 
toil. Nor are the facts of evolutionary biology consistent with the descent 
of all human beings from a single ancestral pair (monogenesis). Instead the 
best available evidence suggests that modern humans emerged as a splinter 
population from pre-existing hominid groups within the last quarter of a 
million years. . . . [T]he geological record makes it clear that natural disas-
ters, disease, suffering, and death long antedate the emergence of the human 
species. It follows that such phenomena cannot be interpreted as the con-
sequence of human sin. Although the timescale of human evolution vastly 
exceeds that described in Genesis, the emergence of Homo sapiens remains 
a very recent development in the several-billion-year history of life on earth, 
and nothing suggests that humanity’s advent occasioned any change in the 
basic conditions of biological existence.4
Such a summary of the deliverances of empirical science—of physics, 
astronomy, chemistry, geology, and evolutionary biology—encourages 
greeting any remaining sympathetic talk of a historical garden with a mix-
ture of pity and condescension at best (since it betrays such culpable inno-
cence of what is now common knowledge) and with open and unreserved 
hostility at worst (since it endangers our children and society, in ways that 
aren’t always carefully enumerated but that we can be sure are immediate 
and threatening).
So, that’s the setup. I would now like to attempt to show that this ar-
gument from our modern worldview to the denial of our story is inad-
equate. In particular, it misrepresents itself as a contest between religion 
and empirical science (a contest we are all too often to regard as akin to 
a match between a toddler and an 800-pound gorilla), when in fact it re-
quires supplementation by way of a piece of metaphysics that has not 
been adequately defended or even acknowledged. Absent the additional 
metaphysical thesis, it is possible for a proponent of the story to grant 
all the alleged implications of our modern worldview informed by phys-
ics, astronomy, chemistry, geology, and biology, and nevertheless to retain 
4Ian McFarland “The Fall and Sin,” in Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology, ed. John Web-
ster, Kathryn Tanner, and Iain Torrance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 140–159.
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adherence to the story without becoming a proper object of ridicule. Or, 
if still ridiculous, this status will have to be established by discrediting a 
piece of metaphysics and not by admiring the fruits of empirical science.5
A brief aside: In this respect, I think our present topic bears an interest-
ing resemblance to debates supposedly between the empirical scientists 
and the metaphysicians. To illustrate—imagine that from the armchair you 
have worked your way to the belief that P, but it has recently been brought 
to your attention that physicists have been saying that not-P. What to do?
First option: be thankful you live amongst physicists who can instruct 
you on what to think, and proclaim to one and all that not-P.
Second option: worry about whether the experts have been quoted cor-
rectly—always, I suspect, a good option to explore if one comes upon 
the information by way of some popularization or other of genuine sci-
entific work.
Third option: acknowledge the accuracy of the quote, but suspect that 
the speakers are overconfident about the strength of the evidence for 
the position in question—perhaps on general skeptical grounds or per-
haps on grounds specific to and unflattering of prominent physicists. 
(It’s not as if I think this scenario is often more likely than not; I’m just 
surprised to see it so frequently regarded as the round-square of the 
options—that physicists just couldn’t be in error about what their evi-
dence supports.)
Fourth option: suggest that in venturing far beyond, say, claims about 
which items play distinctive roles in physical theories, the physicists 
are out of their area of expertise and are speaking as naïve metaphysi-
cians in endorsing the position in question.
Fifth option: maintain that the physicists don’t see the controversial meta-
physical underpinnings of their scientific results and that they are really 
engaged in a battle of metaphysics against metaphysics rather than the 
alleged one-sided embarrassment of physics against metaphysics. (Com-
pare the response of the committed presentist or superluminal travel 
theorist confronted with alleged implications of Special Relativity.)
In returning to our main topic, then, let me confess that I suspect there is 
really a metaphysical thesis at issue, and a victory (if victory it turns out to 
be) for a proponent of our modern worldview will require him to wear at 
least two hats, one of science and one of metaphysics.
*****
Eternalism, Presentism, and the Growing Block Thesis are three leading 
theories in the philosophy of time. Roughly, whereas Presentism holds 
5A quick note: I’m not interested in arguing that those theists attracted to the story must be 
saddled with the metaphysics to come. Rather, I’m arguing that (despite enthusiastic reports 
from the front lines) they have not yet been refuted by the science at hand.
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that only present things exist, the Growing Block Thesis recognizes the ex-
istence of both past and present items, while Eternalism countenances the 
existence of past, present, and even future objects. The literature on these 
matters is rich, the arguments deep and difficult, and the consequences 
for other areas of inquiry significant. Each theory has its able advocates; 
all are going-concerns in contemporary metaphysics. The moves I wish 
to make are, I believe, consistent with any of these theories, but they are 
clearest and most accessible when viewed against the backdrop of the 
Growing Block.6
The Growing Block Thesis offers us a picture of the universe featuring a 
spacetime volume that increases as time passes. At any given moment ex-
actly one time is special—the time associated with the hyperplane on the 
surface of the Block in the direction of its growth. The outermost surface, 
so to speak, is the new slice on the block; it didn’t exist moments before, 
and although it will continue to exist, it will not remain the outermost 
surface moments hence. During its brief instant in the spotlight—before 
becoming evermore imprisoned in the Block’s interior—its stock of facts 
and events are present. Soon they will become forever past and take their 
eternal places frozen in the Block, but for one shining moment they are 
privileged—balanced on the very edge of Being.
On some scorecards, the Growing Block Thesis is thought to combine 
the best features of its primary rivals. Like Presentism, it proclaims the 
uniqueness of the present, recognizes objective and irreducible temporal 
properties, takes tense seriously, and countenances the genuine passage 
of time. Like Eternalism, it furnishes truth-makers for past truths, pro-
vides relata for cross-temporal relations, and acknowledges the existence 
of many objects that are not present. Of course, this very combination of 
commitments is also alleged to be the source of its decisive refutation, with 
opponents complaining that if it were true, we (absurdly) could not know 
it is now now or else would risk living amongst zombies in the Block (i.e., 
amongst nonpresent existants with no consciousness).7 Other critiques balk 
at a privileged present and allege incompatibility with Special and Gener-
al Relativity or else target the endorsement of time’s passage, maintaining 
that the view must be supplemented by a hypertime in which the growing 
of the Block occurs and the rate of passage can be measured. Whereas I 
judge this latter criticism to be in error, I am nevertheless intrigued by the 
6The least comfortable fit, however, will be with Presentism which would have to be con-
joined with some additional (otherwise unmotivated) theses. For formulations and discussions 
of the Growing Block Thesis see C. D. Broad’s Scientific Thought (London: Kegan Paul, 1923); 
and Michael Tooley’s Time, Tense and Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
7On the alleged obstacle to knowing whether it is now now, see Craig Bourne’s “When 
am I?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002), pp. 359–371; and David Braddon-Mitchell’s 
“How Do We Know it is Now Now?” Analysis 64 (2004), pp. 199–203. For the zombie prob-
lem, see Peter Forrest’s “The Real but Dead Past: a Reply to Braddon-Mitchell,” Analysis 64 
(2004), pp. 358–362; and Chris Heathwood’s “The Real Price of the Dead Past: a Reply to For-
rest and Braddon-Mitchell,” Analysis 65 (2005), pp. 249–251. For an attempt to undermine the 
motivation for the Growing Block Thesis, see Trenton Merricks’s “Goodbye Growing Block,” 
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2 (2006), pp. 103–110.
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combination of the Growing Block Thesis and the hypothesis of hyper-
time.8 Even if not wedded by necessity, this conjunction of theses initially 
seems both intelligible and metaphysically possible, and (significantly) 
not immediately disqualified by appeal to our modern worldview.
Entertaining our combination-view, we may maintain that Reality or 
the Block grows by a certain number of standard events per second and 
that it (normally) hypergrows at a certain number of ticktocks per second 
(where a ticktock is an interval of hypertime as a second is an interval of 
time).9 Recent literature reveals that the intelligibility and metaphysical 
possibility of this combination has also intrigued others, especially those 
who hope to exploit the resources of hypertime not to respond to a call for 
time’s rate of passage but rather to account (and in a very satisfying way) for 
backwards time travel.10 The crucial observation—both in those discus-
sions of time travel and in our present investigation—is quite simply that 
whereas for each instant of hypertime, the facts about what is past and 
present are determined by the features of the Block in existence at that 
hypertime, the features of the Block at one hypertime need not constrain 
its features at other hypertimes. Illustration of this point is more difficult 
in the time travel scenarios which are often complicated by further factors 
and are not embedded in a theistic discussion. Fortunately, though, God 
is front and center in our story and (perhaps) is able and willing to do the 
heavy lifting. Allow me to explain.
Omnipotent as He is, God has it within His Power to bring about any 
state of affairs consistent with His essential nature. (Insert excepting-claus-
es into that claim if you are libertarian on free will or a fan of indetermin-
istic devices.) The Growing Block, like each of its contents, is a contingent 
entity. At any given hypertime, there could have been no Block at all, or 
the same Block with different contents, or the same contents in a different 
Block, or a different Block with different contents, or a piece of the old 
Block surrounded by bits of a new one, and so on. Moreover, apart from 
8J. J. C. Smart challenges the notion of temporal becoming and raises pointed questions 
about the need for a hypertime in his “The River of Time,” Mind 58 (1949), pp. 483–494; and 
in his “The Space-Time World: an Excerpt from Philosophy and Scientific Realism,” reprinted 
in Metaphysics: The Big Questions, ed. Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998), pp. 94–101. Ned Markosian meets this challenge without resort to hyper-
time in his “How Fast Does Time Pass?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1993), 
pp. 829–844.
9In his “Changing the Past,” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (forthcoming), Peter van Inwa-
gen adopts this strategy for measuring the growth of the Block in time by letting a standard 
event be a single vibration of a cesium atom and by assuming the number of cesium atoms to 
remain constant. Other stand-ins for standard events are available. Moreover, we are free to 
choose the hypertime interval named by ‘ticktock,’ and for convenience let it be the interval 
that (normally) yields one second of growth on the Block. The need for the parenthetical-
qualification ‘(normally)’ both in this note and the main text will emerge shortly.
10See G. C. Goddu’s “Time Travel and Changing the Past: (Or How to Kill Yourself and 
Live to Tell the Tale),” Ratio 16 (2003), pp. 16–32; and Peter van Inwagen’s “Changing the 
Past,” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (forthcoming). For a critical discussion and extension of 
the proposed model of time travel to Eternalist and Presentist theories of time, see Hud Hud-
son and Ryan Wasserman’s “van Inwagen on Time Travel and Changing the Past,” Oxford 
Studies in Metaphysics (forthcoming).
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sequences inconsistent with the divine nature, there are no metaphysi-
cally necessary rules on how things look block-wise from one hypertime 
to the next. God’s powers of creation and annihilation extend from seam-
lessly replacing one Block with another in hypertime, to destroying large 
portions of a Block’s leading edge at a hypertime instant, to altering large 
portions of everything but a Block’s leading edge at a hypertime instant. It 
is this final case that will prove to be of interest to us here.
As a warm-up exercise, suppose that God’s creative activity had taken 
the following form. At hypertime H0, God created the very first “slice” (or, 
more carefully, hyperplane) of the very first Block in hypertime history 
and set it a go. Standard events transpired as standard events are wont 
to do, new hyperplanes charted the Block’s growth, time began slipping 
into the future at a rate of n standard events per second, and the seconds 
shuffled by at a steady rate of one second per ticktock of hypertime. After 
one minute had transpired, at H60, God brought into existence a solitary 
angel, and after another minute had transpired, at H120, God brought into 
existence a second angel as a companion for the first. After observing their 
interaction for yet another minute, at H180, God annihilated the hyper-
planes corresponding to the two minutes of the Block nearest its leading 
edge and replaced them with a single slice inhabited by two angels. God 
then observed their interaction for a final minute at which time it was 
also H240. (Figure 1 provides an image to orient you, in which the verti-
cal axis represents time and the horizontal axis hypertime. As is custom-
ary in such figures, one spatial dimension has been suppressed, and thus 
our familiar trio of spatial dimensions at any time is represented by the 
perfectly-square, two-dimensional cross section of the block correspond-
ing to that time on the vertical axis.) What can be said of the world at this 
point in the story?
 
H0           H60             H120             H180              H240
Figure 1
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In response to this question, we would do well to insist on two rather dif-
ferent replies, sharply separating what is true about the past at H240 and 
what is true about the hyperpast at H240. First story first: At H240, the Block is 
two minutes old (even though at the hyperearlier H180 it was three minutes 
old). It is now and has always been true that there was never any solitary 
angel in existence, for there exists only a pair of angels who are exactly the 
same age—both one minute or 60 ticktocks old. Second story: At H240, it is 
hypernow and hyperhistorically true that there hyperwas a solitary angel 
in existence, despite the fact that every angel that has ever existed has had 
a companion at all the times it was ever present.
These perplexing pronouncements escape contradiction only by be-
ing carefully sorted into claims about what is true now and in the past 
at a hypertime—facts that are fixed by how the Block that is present at that 
hypertime is constituted—and into claims about what is true hypernow and 
hyperhistorically—facts that are fixed by how the Blocks that are present at suc-
cessive hypertimes are constituted.
Note also that from the perspective of hyperhistory, the Block twice had 
the property of being exactly one-and-a-half minutes old. This hyperoc-
curred at H90 and hyperagain at H210. Moreover, at those two hypertimes 
the Block was exactly the same at all its regions corresponding to the first 
minute of its history, yet different at all its regions corresponding to the 
remaining 30 seconds of its history. Whereas hyperearlier it contained a 
solitary angel during that 30-second interval, hyperlater it didn’t. Absent 
hypertime, the slogan “if now past—forevermore past” is secure and true, 
but with the hypertime backdrop in place, the slogan “if now hyperpast—
forevermore past” falls to counterexample, provided the right sequence of 
Blocks line up in a cooperative way in hypertime.11
We should now be primed for the application of our metaphysical pic-
ture of time and God’s powers of creation and annihilation to our main 
theme. Consider the following hypothesis:
In the beginning—perhaps not at the first hypertime, but at the first 
hypertime to contain a Block universe—God created a spacetime and 
its contents whose earliest stages of growth witnessed the forming of a 
man from the dust of the ground, the planting of a garden into which 
he was placed, the adorning of that garden with trees and rivers, the 
imposition of a restriction on his diet, the presentation and naming of 
the animals, the extraction of a rib from and creation of a companion 
11In fact, we have traded one slogan for sixteen. (1) if now past—forever past, (2) If now 
past—forever hyperpast, (3) if now past—forhyperever past, (4) if now past—forhyperever 
hyperpast, (5) if now hyperpast—forever past, (6) if now hyperpast—forever hyperpast, (7) 
if now hyperpast—forhyperever past, (8) if now hyperpast—forhyperever hyperpast, (9) if 
hypernow past—forever past, (10) if hypernow past—forever hyperpast, (11) if hypernow 
past—forhyperever past, (12) if hypernow past—forhyperever hyperpast, (13) if hypernow 
hyperpast—forever past, (14) if hypernow hyperpast—forever hyperpast, (15) if hypernow 
hyperpast—forhyperever past, (16) if hypernow hyperpast—forhyperever hyperpast. (The 
reader with hypertime on her hands is invited to determine just how many of these theses 
must surrender to counterexample.)
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for him, the fateful discourse of a snake . . . and a rebellion which took 
the form of eating an apple. And as the Block grew, this once naked 
and innocent pair fashioned clothing, hid themselves and were found, 
confessed their disobedience, and received the heavy news of its conse-
quences. Finally, driven out of the garden, they and their world under-
went a spectacular change.
At the hypermoment the pair exited the garden, say at H10-million, God an-
nihilated every piece of the Block save that region on its outermost edge 
thus occupied by these ancestors of ours and then embedded that very 
region and its contents in a new Block—a Block sporting a several-bil-
lion-year history, replete with ice ages, long-dead hominids, dinosaurs, 
primordial soups, condensing matter, even a big bang.
In fact, their brave new world—the very Block universe that is hyper-
present now—is remarkably accurately described in great detail by 
contemporary physics and astronomy, chemistry and geology. More-
over, this special pair of our ancestors themselves had ancestors from 
whom they descended in precisely the manner taught by evolutionary 
biology.
Fill in the rest of the story as a devoted disciple of contemporary science; 
the new sections of the Block are a ready canvas to be painted as our mod-
ern world view instructs. We are in a position to concede its correctness 
on all fronts.
Moreover, if you tend toward a mereological essentialism for Blocks, 
note that nothing hangs on one and the same Block surviving the an-
nihilation-and-recreation of this version of the Fall, so long as the new 
Block sports the salient piece of the old one (together with its occupants). 
And also note that, quite in step with tradition, this version of the Fall 
has profound consequences not just for our protagonists, but for all 
of creation.
Again, in the process of entertaining this entertaining hypothesis, we 
would do well to insist on distinguishing two different sets of claims, 
those reporting history and those reporting hyperhistory. History, for ex-
ample, indeed reveals that “modern humans emerged as a splinter popu-
lation from pre-existing hominid groups within the last quarter of a mil-
lion years,” and perhaps our pair appeared at a unique threshold in this 
development as the very first creatures also to be persons. To be sure, they 
never lived carefree lives of safety in a garden, immune from the dangers 
of a world red in tooth and claw. On the contrary, their existence was one 
of constant peril and entirely given over to toil for food, shelter, and the 
basic necessities of life. But hyperhistory has a different story to tell. This 
very same pair, once upon a hypertime, lived in just such a garden and in just 
such an innocent state, blessed and protected by a special grace. Of course, 
despite tremendous efforts and many false reports across the centuries, no 
one has ever found the least trace of this original home, for the simple and 
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obvious reason that it never existed. It may have hyperexisted—but well, 
you just can’t get hyperthen from here.
There are many ways to flesh out the story at this point. Here’s one. 
These parents of ours would have no memory of their experiences in the 
garden, for after all those experiences didn’t happen to them (they hy-
perhappened) and memories are drawn from one’s past (not always from 
one’s hyperpast). Perhaps—once repositioned in the newly-furnished 
Block—the special couple in our story were among the very first individu-
als to rise to rationality, to achieve the status of being moral agents, to 
exercise their newfound capacity to sin. Perhaps one of them can be cred-
ited with the original sin—the first in all of history. Perhaps it was a sin of 
disobedience. Perhaps it even involved an apple. Examining the contents 
of the Block will tell. If they were to happen to satisfy these historical de-
scriptions (in addition to committing the hyperhistorical sin occasioning 
the Fall) our couple would have played precisely the sort of role envi-
sioned for some genuine historical figures or other by those who have 
abandoned hope of a literal reading of the garden myth but who main-
tain that it nevertheless represents a genuine moment in history when our 
forebears turned away from God.
A reminder: I am one of those people. I’m not inclined to countenance 
hypertime, and I don’t believe our entertaining hypothesis is true. I agree 
that the literal reading should be abandoned and that a pared-down 
historical event stripped of those characteristics offending our modern 
worldview should be raised in its place. But I don’t think our modern 
worldview is in a position to foist this verdict upon us, since for all I can 
tell, that worldview is consistent with a metaphysics that permits us to eat 
our cake and hyper have it too—that is, that allows us to say there never was 
such a garden, but also that there hyperwas.
There are, of course, other routes to rejection of our entertaining hy-
pothesis. I think a proper refutation would be best grounded in some wor-
ry about occupation relations between objects and regions, or in worries 
about whether causation is supposed to track history or hyperhistory, or 
in personal identity across hypertimes (e.g., the psychological criterion of 
persistence for persons seems to be at odds with the details of our story), 
or in some philosophical objection designed to show that the hypertimes 
of our story are just mislabeled times, whereas the times of our story are 
something else altogether. But, again, these topics take us immediately 
into metaphysical waters.12
Theological obstacles may surface as well. Aren’t the Scriptures and the 
Church Fathers unnecessarily quiet about hypertime, especially if it has 
such a lavish role to play? Perhaps, but then again, loading up Genesis 
with heavy-handed descriptions of hypertime and spacetime manifolds 
12I defend theses about the occupation relation that would provide an objection of the 
first sort in chapter 4 of The Metaphysics of Hyperspace, and I defend theses about parthood 
and persistence that would provide an objection of the second sort in chapters 3–5 of my A 
Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
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might have made it a bit less accessible to its intended audience.13 But isn’t 
it clear that tradition places the story in our own past and not in our hyper-
past? Perhaps it’s not so clear. Tradition says these events happened, but 
that may prove to be a commitment neutral between history and hyper-
history. Without the resources to say so, tradition certainly doesn’t take an 
explicit stand against hyperhistory, and once the distinction is on the table 
and choices are to be made, spoils-to-the-victor considerations may se-
lect hyperhistory as the best refinement.14 Still, theological objections may 
prevail, but as we are endlessly reminded, theology is not science—and if 
the present olive branch is ultimately dismissed on theological grounds, 
I simply remind the reader that the primary goal of this exercise was to 
block the dismissal by appeal to the science of our modern worldview.
In closing, I think it worthwhile to mention a few curious and pleasant 
features of the hypothesis. Although our past is clearly marked by a his-
tory of pain, disease, suffering, and death that long predates any original 
sin committed by our first parents with the requisite capacities, we may 
nevertheless continue to investigate the hypothesis that by way of the hy-
peroriginal sin (i.e., not the first sin to occur in time, but the first to occur 
in hypertime) did disease, suffering, and death make their way onto the 
hypertime stage and in just the way our story above would have it. More-
over, theologians attracted to a thesis of creation ex nihilo requiring a time 
at which God exists alone and apart from what is yet to be created may 
be favorably disposed towards hypertime and the resources it affords. 
Finally—given the details of the story above—even though there exists 
a Block that reaches some 10 to 20 billion years into the past, and even 
though its interior contains dinosaurs and the like, none of those items 
was ever present or on the outermost face of the growing Block (for they 
all came into being together).15 Accordingly, if those theorists who have 
defended the growing Block theory from the critiques catalogued above 
are correct to claim that the Block’s occupants are conscious only when 
they are located on its outermost edge—then we also get a solution to the 
problem of preFall animal pain and suffering for free. (Or nearly for free, 
since one cost would involve affirming that consciousness had a surpris-
ingly dramatic and abrupt debut in world history.) Still, all in all, those 
aren’t inconsiderable advantages.
But whether any benefit comes from there being hypertimes at which 
there are no times or from having both an original sin and a hyperoriginal 
sin to choose from when dealing with the thorny problems raised by the 
doctrine of original sin or by general creation or by natural evil is a topic 
for another occasion.
13Compare Peter van Inwagen’s “Genesis and Evolution,” reprinted in God, Knowledge, and 
Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 128–162. 
Alternatively, Michel Barnes floated the hopeful hypothesis in conversation that the Church 
Fathers may not be so silent on the topic, after all! See Origen on creation.
14Thanks to Josh Armstrong for discussion on this point.
15Thanks to Aris Hudson for pressing this point.
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In conclusion, then, I submit that the argument from our modern world-
view to the denial of our story has been exposed as inadequate. Before we 
can indulge the inclination to ridicule or to insist on a simple correction 
of a primitive and outmoded religious view drawn exclusively from em-
pirical science, we have a metaphysical debate to recognize and evaluate. 
Accordingly, to the extent that one can keep the growing-block-cum-hy-
pertime thesis in play in the philosophy of time, one can also tell a just-so 
story accommodating both the relevant verdicts of our modern worldview 
and a full-blooded realism about a hyperhistorical garden.16
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